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banks to whom Eastern owed so much money. 
In Atlanta we listened to a very somber Frank [Excerpt] Borman describe how the banks, led by Chase 
Manhattan and Citibank, were refusing to roll over loans that were coming due. The bankers insisted that 
Borman win "concessions" from us by June 21 or Eastern would be thrown into "technical default." 
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The message read, "Be in Atlanta for emergency meeting of unions 
with Eastern" and was signed by Charlie Bryan. The contract we had 
won with Eastern now had to be defended against the banks to 
whom Eastern owed so much money. 
In Atlanta we listened to a very somber Frank Borman describe 
how the banks, led by Chase Manhattan and Citibank, were refusing 
to roll over loans that were coming due. The bankers insisted that 
Borman win "concessions" from us by June 21 or Eastern would be 
thrown into "technical default." 
Although the message was very similar to the doom-and-gloom 
that he had performed so well over the previous seven years, 
"Colonel" Borman seemed different. My first impression was that 
the "boy who cried wolf" many times before had a powerful set of 
jaws truly clamped to his behind. Something else was different. His 
willingness to listen, to request our advice, to try something different. 
He suggested the formation of a "Labor Council" similar to Pan Am's, 
made up of representatives of all the unions, to make suggestions 
and come up with a program "to handle the present crisis and 
beyond'/ We, the union leaders, pointed out that non-contract 
employees should be represented in the "Labor Council." 
A couple of meetings of the newly formed council took place over 
the next four or five days, and we then scheduled a meeting with 
the "lead-lenders" in New York. Anticipation, research, preparation 
and presentation were our strong points in negotiations, and we 
Marty Urra is president of LAM Local 702 at Eastern's base in Miami. 
He is also chair of District 100's Contract Research Committee. 
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$117 million due to the failure of Drysdale Government 
Securities. 
handled this meeting in the same way. Locker-Abrecht Associates, carri 
our corporate finance consultants, were contacted. They were to do extn 
some "digging into Chase Manhattan and Citibank" and accompany theii 
us to the meeting. Fi] 
The lenders' position was presented by Michael Crews, who
 w o u 
represents Chase Manhattan. In his cold, monotone, German- 757 
accented style he proceeded to match Orson Wells' doom-and- gloom pUS] 
in the classic War of the Worlds. He explained how the banks had
 t^at 
backed Eastern in the past, but "now that one or more players in " j e a ( 
the team had refused to continue cooperating" the additional risks Q^a 
made it impossible for them to put additional money into this ^ 
company.
 n m 
"Risk" was the key word and to those of us who must make similar . 
decisions on our credit union board, it exposed the weakness of their ^ . ' 
argument. We knew that bankers increase interest rates when risky . 
clients attempt to renegotiate debts, but they never force a default 
unless everything is hopeless. Eastern's line of credit was only on ' 
"prime rate" while other truly weak airlines were on "prime plus . , 
1%" or "prime plus 2%." JJ*J 
Our anticipated research was right on cue, however. Charlie Bryan 
shuffled through a file put together by Mike Locker and Steve 
Abrecht just hours earlier. He explained to Mr. Crews that it would 
be a shame if we had to get down to such tactics, but that we might Y ] 
have to go public with potentially embarassing information about ^ ^ 
the banks—interjecting that everyone present was well aware of our °* " 
past success in utilizing the media. * f 
Bryan questioned Chase's ability to handle additional losses in the ^ ^ 
event bankers forced EAL to default. He pointed out that Chase had But: 
recently lost: w ° u 
In 
natr 
prot 
— $75 million on loans acquired from Perm Square Bank after O1 
the latter was declared insolvent. 1977 
Hryl 
— At least $45 milllion when Lombard-Wall, Inc. collapsed. ^
 tj 
— $61 million in real estate activities in Puerto Rico. W< 
3,50( 
— And a total of $1.4 billion in non-performing loans at year-
 c 
end 1982. j
 o f c 
Bryan questioned how the average Chase stockholder or depositor | intei 
would feel about Chase Manhattan causing the Number 1 passenger \ issu< 
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carrier in the U.S. to go out of business due to unwillingness to take 
extra risks when our files show that recently Chase had increased 
their risk by rolling over loans to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
Finally, Charlie pointed out that if Eastern went bankrupt, Boeing 
would lose a bundle in lost orders and its entire program for the new 
757 plane would be placed in jeopardy. Boeing might in fact be 
pushed into default also, and Charlie didn't think the banks wanted 
that. Our research showed that Eastern and Boeing shared the same 
"lead-lenders." How many millions of dollars in bad loans were 
Chase and Citibank willing to "write off"? 
Michael Crews smiled for the first time and explained almost 
nervously that Chase was not in question. He added that simply 
put, the presentation made by management was unacceptable; but 
since we had presented additional facts, the lenders would be willing 
to re-assess their position. He concluded that if after meeting with 
us, management should present them a "different scenario," they 
would review it for recommendation to the other banks participating 
in the agreement. A small change in the tone of his voice.. .a big 
change in attitude. 
In the following weeks the IAM responded with a positive alter-
native (to a pay cut) that would address the "cash shortage" issue 
yet maintain the integrity of our recently negotiated contract. The 
IAM encouraged individual members to voluntarily lend a portion 
of their wages to Eastern at a ten per cent rate of interest. 
I am sure the bankers looked at this IAM alternative as very bad 
tasting medicine since it put the employees in competition with them. 
But since it did address the cash shortage problem, turning it down 
would have been tantamount to saying that there was no cash 
problem. 
It Started with a $15 Course 
Our approach to research as a part of bargaining began back in 
1977 when my predecessor as president of IAM Local 702, Steve 
Hrytzay, surveyed our membership in order to better define priorities 
in the 1978 contract negotiations. 
We mailed out over 5,000 questionnaires and received approximately 
3,500 responses. The results showed that members were most 
concerned about our pension plan. Older members were interested, 
of course, as retirement came near, but younger workers were 
interested as well since they saw the pension plan as a job security 
issue. 
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I was editor of the Local 702 Newsletter then, and decided to 
educate myself more about pensions so I could write some articles 
for the newsletter. Andy Banks, assistant director of Florida Interna-
tional University's Center for Labor Research and Studies, had put 
together a group of experts on the issue of retirement pensions. A 
$15 tuition fee for that course started the ball rolling towards a whole 
new approach in collective bargaining. 
The training in that course turned out to be more than a source 
for a newsletter article. With the new knowledge of the availability 
of information through the 5500 forms, we went to work on how 
we fared within our own company in comparison with the eleven 
other employee groups. This new information pointed to our union's 
past misconception that 1) we had fared well within Eastern's work 
groups, and 2) that we were a high-cost pension group. 
The administration in office in District 100 was offered all the 
information that the local had surveyed and researched. (Under our 
structure it's the district, not the local, that negotiates with Eastern.) 
But the "old school" administration ignored the survey and the 
pension research. We started looking for new leadership. 
A New Candidate 
Active members and elected representatives from all over the 
country came to a meeting in Local 702 Secretary-Treasurer Tom 
leper's back yard. We were "nailing down" our candidate for the 
upcoming district election. Charles E. Bryan easily impressed 
everyone with his frank talk and obvious dedication to "reforming 
our district." 
I asked for a couple of commitments: that he consider the training 
of the negotiating committee and the formation of a corporate 
research team before negotiations. It was then that I found Charles 
Bryan's flexibility and progressive thinking. It wasn't long before 
Charlie was fully prepared and was campaigning on such needs 
within the collective bargaining system. It was a campaign that 
answered the membership's longtime plea to "get a bunch of experts 
and lawyers to put up against the 'pros' from management." 
While many union leaders hesitate to use outside consultants, it 
is my evaluation that they are making a mistake in anticipating their 
membership's perception of such a move. The feeling that the 
membership will look down on their ability is wrong. Most members 
today are very aware of the technical sophistication employed by 
corporations in all phases of labor relations. The admission that we 
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(union representatives) need technical and specialized assistance 
from consultants is simply a recognition of the obvious. Our working 
contact with our members proved to us that such an approach was 
not only considered "common sense" and "the responsible thing to 
do" but, because of the fact that they have long clamored for such 
innovations, the technique proved a political asset. 
There is some danger of "takeover" by consultants in the 
negotiating arena, but this is true more when consultants or experts 
are used by turning over the negotiations to them. Our approach 
was to utilize consultants for technical, statistical and research sup-
port. The most effective use of consultants, however, was developed 
through the assistance of Andrew Banks and his staff. Andy's 
concept of consultants doing developmental training in order to 
facilitate our continuing internal research was the most successful 
specific technique used in our project. This, of course, relaxes the 
dependency on consultants, and future use becomes more depen-
dent on the desire than the need for information. 
The Charlie Bryan "Team" swept the elections and swept me into 
the presidency of the district's largest local (Local Lodge 702 has over 
6,000 members). Two major things were accomplished: 1) The 
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philosophy of the largest local and the district were for the first time 
one and the same. And 2) all internal strife disappeared and the 
company was the only and common opposition. 
Soon President Bryan asked me to form a Contract Research 
Committee and to start preparing for contract negotiations that were 
yet two years ahead. He had decided that contract research would 
be an ongoing activity at District 100. 
Eastern's management had subdued all the employees with con-
tinuous brow-beating emphasizing our main competitor, non-union 
Delta. Our members were sick of hearing about Delta and its 
advantages over us in workrules, productivity, profits, etc. 
The first volley fired by the union in the statistical war that ensued 
was directed at Eastern vs. Delta, and it was so overwhelming in 
statistical advantage that it even surprised us. 
Local 702's newspaper bragged in its front-page headline, "Be 
Proud—We're No. 1." It provided fourteen hard facts that proved 
beyond any doubt that Eastern and its work force was outflying Delta 
not only in quantity but in quality. Most revealing, however, was that 
we were doing so with 24 fewer employees per aircraft. The question 
was then put . . ."If Delta's non-unionization and flexible work rules 
are so productive, why do they need 24 more employees per aircraft 
to be No. 2 and in some statistics fifth, sixth and seventh?" 
The information was positive, it made the membership feel good 
(everyone loves to be a winner), but most encompassing, it started 
the disintegration of management's credibility. 
Informing the Membership 
The pension plan was our most productive source of comparative 
data early in the campaign. I call it a campaign because we were in 
a battle to regain control of a membership that Frank Borman had 
personally "Pied Piper Style" drawn to his side with shop floor 
meetings, letters to the home and very astute use of the press. 
Although pensions are a complicated subject, we reduced the ' 
statistics and facts to the lowest possible denominator. In the case 
of the cost in each pension plan, we reduced it to cents per hour 
so that everyone clearly could relate to how they fared. "Yes, the 
average Eastern employee's pension cost was $1.19 per hour in 1980. 
However, that's not our cost. Let's see the breakdown.. .Non-contract 
employees' cost was 84* per hour.. .Mechanics and Related (our 
group) was 71*.. .the Flight Attendants' cost was 27* per hour.. .and 
last but certainly never least, the Pilots' was $4.86..." 
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Additionally we made wide use of charts and graphs to simplify 
the presentations, which by now had involved the membership other 
than just through the newsletter. 
Management's strategy during the first Borman sales campaign of 
the Variable Earnings Program (1977) was to scare the employees in 
the bottom third of the seniority list with threats of "cutting back 
the airline/' while offering improved retirement benefits that appealed 
to the top third of the seniority list. Since a hiring spree had been 
undertaken in 1979 and 1980, it was obvious to us that we had to 
prepare our junior members. 
At my request, the Executive Board of Local 702 approved the 
expansion of the regular monthly membership meetings. Since 
Eastern runs a twenty-four hour, three-shift operation, "information 
meetings" were scheduled for 7:30 a.m. for the outgoing "graveyard 
shift" and 1 p.m. (before work) for the afternoon shift. 
At these meetings the information was meant to: 1) acquaint the 
members—especially the young ones—with the history of how their 
present wages and benefits were fought for, 2) build their 
management-scarred pride with comparison statistics that attested 
to their present success as a workforce, 3) warn them of any 
anticipated moves on the part of the company, including financial 
results that we could project before their release, 4) shock them with 
the comparison of our pension plan with that of the pilots, and 
5) weaken management's credibility by exposing the company's tactic 
of emphasizing the negatives. 
Our membership had created the political platform on which 
Charlie Bryan had been elected. Among their appeals was the almost 
frustrated plea that "we ought to hire a bunch of lawyers and take 
the company experts on in negotiations." At the membership meeting 
the membership was reminded of the plea that they had all heard 
or said themselves hundreds of times. It was "interpreted" that, of 
course, they meant "consultants and experts in the specific, very com-
plicated issues of contract negotiations since lawyers alone would 
know little of corporate finances." 
That having been said, we followed it with the dramatic announce-
ment of our "retaining" Locker/Abrecht Associates, "a New York firm 
specializing in corporate financial investigations" and "Randy Barber 
of Washington, D.C., co-author of a book on pensions and respected 
labor advisor." 
The key, of course, was that we had acted in agreement to their 
expectations of what was needed. It must be noted, however, that 
the announcement was preceded with information meetings full of 
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statistics produced by our own internal research capabilities. This 
helped to build confidence in our ability and to show favorable results 
from "our investment" in training our research committee. 
Though the announcement was received with jubilation and an 
extended rowdy ovation, it was necessary for them to see results 
immediately, so particularly good or shocking news followed each 
announcement. Locker/Abrecht were credited with "exposing" that 
although Eastern had a lot of debt, "they neglected to tell us in their 
'State-of-the-Company Meetings' that they ended the year with $284 
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million loaned out!" 
Soon other locals of District 100 were requesting our seminar and 
we hit the road with our "dog and pony" show, involving the 
audience. 
At times when facts and figures were "exposed," the "proof" was 
shown to someone in the front row. Much as a magician shows the 
empty hat to a volunteer from the audience, Eastern's yearly report 
was shown to someone as the "money loaned out" was pointed to 
under short-term investment and the financial entry was explained 
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fully. Soon the ''education" had paid off and in later meetings ques-
tions were replaced with contributions from the more curious who 
had bothered to dig up some positive statistics on their own. 
Curiously, those attending would remember enough about the facts 
and figures to raise the interest of others back on the job but not 
enough to fully explain it. This caused a mushrooming effect on at-
tendance at "information meetings" and our biggest problem became 
accommodating everyone in our meeting hall. Later in the critical 
stages of our negotiations, an auditorium sometimes had to be leased 
that would accomodate as many as the 3,500 that would show up 
from the combined day and graveyard shift. 
Positive Alternatives and Psychological Jujitsu 
We were not always on the offensive, as we found out when the 
company unilaterally set up a Quality Citcle program. Based on what 
little we already knew about such programs, it was obvious that they 
certainly could easily be used as a union-busting tool. 
Again we were willing to admit our limitations and we requested 
professional assistance from the Florida International University 
Center for Labor Research and Studies. Andrew Banks had done 
extensive research on good and bad "Quality of Work Life" programs. 
His expertise was utilized to train a negotiating/steering commitee, 
and the stewards were given a seminar on the do's and don't's of 
the Japanese experience. 
Through Andy's assistance we had reacted quickly enough to 
formulate an alternative program.. .with ground rules and guidelines 
that increased workplace democracy without replacing the union as 
spokesmen in the shops. The positive alternative (to company 
programs which had the appearance of answers to "our needs") 
proved to be a successful counter measure. 
The union reaction of a positive counter program was meant to 
make sense to our membership, to other employee groups within 
the company that now could not tag the union as contrary, and to 
an outsider (the press) who usually only bothered to see the surface 
without checking "the small print." 
This concept of redirecting the force of company formulated 
programs rather than taking a negative, obstructionist role was soon 
recognized as the perfect tool to fight the "concession fever" that by 
1982 had become a corporate epidemic. 
Labeled "Psychological Jujitsu" (Psy-Judo), the positive alternative 
concept was the perfect weapon to answer layoff threats, punitive 
attendance programs and pay-cut concession demands. 
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When Eastern announced a layoff that could be avoided if we 
accepted a 10% pay cut, we answered with a proposal for a leave 
of absence program and a retirement incentive program. Needless 
to say Eastern went through with the layoff but our members didn't 
blame the union. They blamed the "stubborn management that 
wouldn't accept the reasonable union program." 
As Eastern initiated a "Zone" attendance program meant to punish 
employees for poor attendance, we countered with a positive incen-
tive program made up of options from other successful programs 
that we had researched. Employees and lower management easily 
sided with our concept. 
The most successful and meaningful use of Psy-Judo was a year-
long fight to eliminate Eastern's Variable Earnings Program. Since 
it was dependent on an unfair formula for return of money held back, 
the experience of its five-year life was a loss of over $100 million in 
wages to the Eastern employees. 
Eastern management attempted to sell the need to continue the 
same program for an additional five years. They didn't even employ 
the communist bloc technique of changing the name of unsuccessful 
five-year programs. 
Although we had successfully raised a question in everyone's 
minds as to any need for such help from the employees, District 
President Bryan soon publicized our intent to "give Eastern the help 
they needed—though not necessarily the help they want..." 
The design of what was later called the Investment Bonus Agree-
ment was simple to understand, easy to sell and a reasonable method 
for employee assistance. It was more than reasonable since the 
company's VEP called for holding back 3V2% of each employee's 
wages and the IBA offered 5% of the employees' pay. The small print, 
however, read very different. 
The IAM's program was a true investment vehicle where money 
was loaned to Eastern at a 10% annual rate and payable on a profit 
year or by a January 1987 definite payment date. The program still 
maintained the bonus provisions of the old VEP in case of a profit 
year, but deductions were to be made for only two years. 
You can easily imagine the TV reporters with only two minutes 
to cover a story and twenty seconds to do a "wrap-up". They could 
not get into the "small print" or conditions of the program, yet they 
often ended their "wrap" with, "The Machinists certainly appear to 
have taken a reasonable approach to Eastern's request for employee 
assistance. They are offering 5% of their wages when the company's 
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program only asked for 3y2%." 
By September 15, 1982, Eastern had talked us down from a 5% to 
a 3V2% investment program. Yes, the.3%% figure was a face-saver 
meant to give the outside public an impression that the VEP had 
been extended "with some modification" and a different name. There 
lies the second plus to a positive alternative concept; it is a face-saving 
way out for a management that has already surrounded itself in 
official statements about the company's financial crisis, press releases 
about "must-have" issues, and other such doom-and-gloom publicity. 
Immediately after the negotiations were concluded, Eastern's 
management issued a collection of unfortunate statements. The 
Senior Vice President of Labor Relations admitted that the 'last offer" 
and the "let them strike" campaign had been "a big bluff". Board 
Chairman Frank Borman complained that the IAM Contract 
amounted to "blackmail" and that he felt he had been "raped". 
Normally to a union leader such statements would almost amount 
to an award or trophy. To District 100, however, it was a poor descrip-
tion of the affair (no pun intended). It was our intent to use common 
sense arguments, fed by research and backed with consultants, in 
order to "seduce" an industry standard agreement out of the manage-
ment committee. 
The Pull Back Technique & the "Final Offer" 
It was evident that Eastern's negotiating technique was meant to 
stall negotiations as much as possible. This was so that the cost in-
creases would take place with the expected economic recovery. They 
could not, however, cause a situation where the federal mediator 
would declare a deadlock (due to lack of progress) and start the thirty-
day strike countdown mandated under the Railway Labor Act. 
Since Eastern could not afford a shutdown of operations through 
a strike, they had to resort to what I call the "pull back technique". 
This negotiating technique simply causes management to give in and 
give in until they narrow the gap with the union. When the union 
has compromised down from the usually inflated first proposal and 
reached an acceptable level—and what appears to be an agreement 
on the issue—then the pull back takes place and management puts 
that issue's acceptable union offer in their "back pocket" for later. 
This is done over and over again with each issue, giving an 
appearance of progress with no identifiable agreement. It does 
provide the potential for a very quick contract agreement, however, 
when during the "eleventh hour" the company can reach into the 
back pocket 
on each issu 
18 months c 
a strike. 
Our evalu 
que for addi 
committee a 
strike dates: 
thereby softt 
the opportu 
Eastern w 
President Br 
that was sut 
strike vote 
statistically I 
It was exfc 
package pay 
increase ovei 
ignored mos 
ment" by ox-
Then cam* 
order to scare 
taped statemi 
relations tacti 
to the steel i 
Braniff's si 
threatened t< 
employees. \ 
members the 
2,000 if they 
year.. .and a 
on Northwes 
Did the me 
program thai 
we had antic 
We anticip; 
practices, bul 
last offer stra 
and "unaccej 
them for a "n 
of ratificatior 
Research, Experts, and Building Solidarity 51 
down from a 5% to 
ire was a face-saver 
a that the VEP had 
ifferent name. There 
ipt; it is a face-saving 
iurrounded itself in 
crisis, press releases 
and-gloom publicity, 
ancluded, Eastern's 
ate statements. The 
i that the'last offer" 
"a big bluff". Board 
the IAM Contract 
lad been "raped". 
Duld almost amount 
was a poor descrip-
tent to use common 
vith consultants, in 
t out of the manage-
r/la/ Offer" 
lique was meant to 
i so that the cost in-
omic recovery. They 
le federal mediator 
) and start the thirty-
ilway Labor Act. 
operations through 
ull back technique". 
Bment to give in and 
n. When the union 
d first proposal and 
to be an agreement 
1 management puts 
:k pocket" for later, 
i issue, giving an 
agreement. It does 
^reement, however, 
r
 can reach into the 
back pocket and agree to that acceptable last offer from the union 
on each issue where "pull back" was employed. It prevents wasting 
18 months and taking a chance on running out of time to prevent 
a strike. 
Our evaluation was that Eastern was using the pull back techni-
que for additional purposes: 1) to attempt to wear down the union 
committee and the membership in general, 2) to time the potential 
strike dates so that the busy holiday seasons would be avoided and 
thereby soften our perception of the impact, 3) to give themselves 
the opportunity of trying to sneak by us a mediocre last offer. 
Eastern was well aware of our constitutional requirement—and 
President Bryan's ethics—that assured a vote on any last minute offer 
that was substantially better than t ^ offer "on the table" when the 
strike vote was taken. Management presented a last minute-
statistically misleading—concessionary package. 
It was extremely back-loaded, but with a high enough end-of-
package pay scale that it allowed them to describe it as "a 32% pay 
increase over the life of the contract." This was a package that totally 
ignored most of the stated union goals and was far from "an agree-
ment" by our committee. 
Then came the onslaught of propaganda: letters to the home in 
order to scare the spouses of employees; the doom-and-gloom video-
taped statements on company finances; repressive and punitive labor 
relations tactics on the shops and ramps, and irrelevant comparisons 
to the steel industry and to bankrupt Braniff Airlines. 
Braniff's situation was also used as management ridiculously 
threatened to replace our members with the out-of-work Braniff 
employees. We didn't even have to point out to our now educated 
members that we had 13,000 IAM employees and Braniff only had 
2,000 if they were still out there without jobs after more than a 
year.. .and after not one of them had replaced the IAM personnel 
on Northwest Airlines during their strike months earlier. 
Did the membership weaken in spite of the thorough educational 
program that the union had undertaken for over two years? Yes, but 
we had anticipated that they would. 
We anticipated that the membership would be softened by such 
practices, but we had also anticipated the company tactics and their 
last offer strategy. For weeks we prepared them for a "substandard" 
and "unacceptable" first offer at the last minute. We also prepared 
them for a "rejection meeting" that never entertained any possibility 
of ratification. 
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Most important, however, was the timing. During the countdown 
the strike deadline was set for March 12, 1983—perfect timing for 
a pre-Easter Holiday strike—but we informed the membership that 
the "rejection meeting" and the necessarily large auditorium had 
already been secured for March 18, "so that a new strike deadline 
could be set for March 25—still ahead of the Easter holiday." 
The membership was then reassured that we were certain that the 
five-day interval provided plenty of time to finalize a true agreement, 
"one that would bring us back to industry standards." 
It was the March 18th turn down meeting that became the "ace 
up our sleeve". First of all, it was to be the last word prior to the vote 
since we had changed our balloting procedure to avoid the past 
-mistake of issuing a ballot at the door. This had in the past caused 
company-propagandized members to vote and leave without benefit 
Of the union's point of view. Upon entry to the hall, members went 
through the slow process of checking in as per our roster and a stub 
was issued to be filled out—a stub that after our presentation could 
be exchanged for a ballot. 
The most ironic thing to happen at this point was Frank Borman's 
request for "equal time" at our meeting after we had endured one 
weiek of one-sided letters, videotape lectures, and daily management 
scare bulletins. Needless to say he had spoken out of realization that 
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our "ace" could expose his bluff. 
It was at this meeting that the summary of the Locker-Abrecht 
report was released to the membership. The "hidden" millions were 
exposed and explained. The list of analysts optimistic about Eastern 
were detailed by the report, adding to its credibility and the 
disintegration of management's. The report had made the company's 
propaganda blitz sound like one entire week of crying "Wolf"! 
After a tremendously supportive rejection of "the first offer'—that 
management had often labeled their last offer—the tone completely 
changed. Non-contract employees and mid and lower management 
were completely demoralized when the company statement about 
"resuming negotiations" and "certainty of reaching a mutually 
acceptable agreement before the new deadline" surprised them with 
the fact that there was a last, last offer. 
Crystal Ball 
At the noon news show on March 24,1 was asked if I was optimistic 
about a tentative agreement being reached in time to avoid a strike 
at twelve midnight. Charlie Bryan's office had already communicated 
with me that they had met thoughout the night until 7:30 a.m. and 
had gone back together after a couple of hours rest. My response 
on live TV. was that I expected that an agreement would be reported 
by the evening news. 
The day was tense. A dozen reporters were at Local 702 all day 
and the 7 p.m. network news opened with an announcement from 
Washington by the Chief Mediator and President Bryan that a 
tentative agreement had been reached. The reporters wanted to know 
what "inside information" I had to predict an agreement, especially 
such an early settlement. 
Yes, I had been in contact with Pension Consultant Randy Barber 
and was aware of the stages of negotiations during that afternoon, 
but before that—during the noon news—all I had was inside 
knowledge on the strategy and tactics of the chief negotiator. I knew 
Charles E. Bryan and I knew Russ McGarry, our Local 702 representa-
tive on the negotiating committee. Neither one would have talked 
through the night unless the company was contributing to progress. 
Besides, we knew management's back pockets were full of pull-back 
agreements on individual issues. Our committee knew it, our 
committee had prepared for it. The amateurs had graduated; they 
were now true professionals! • 
